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The Meno, Recollection, and the Role of Hypothesis
Joseph A. Novak, University of Waterloo (CANADA)
Presented to the SAGP at its April 2005 meeting
with the Central Division of the APA, Chicago, IL.
Although memory and recollection are topics discussed by some of the chief
figures in Western Philosophy, there are few treatises devoted to a thorough examination
of these two. Aristotle's treatise is one exception in that it captures these two topics in its
very title: De Memoria et Reminiscentia. However, this is a relatively short work and
other treatments and references to these two notions within the Aristotelian corpus are not
that extensive. One should not infer from this that memory does not play an important
role in Aristotle's philosophy nor that memory is considered an insignificant cognitive
ability. In the very first chapter of Metaphysics Alpha Aristotle notes that memories
(mnemai) are the basis of experience (empeiria) which, in turn, becomes the basis for art
(techne) and scientific knowledge (episteme).1 Similarly, memory plays a very important
role in the outline of the process of conceptualization that Aristotle presents in Posterior
Analytics, II, where it is the base upon which sensations gather for higher modes of
cognition.2 Locke's treatment of self-identity makes much use of the concept of memory
and he does note the importance of its role in human knowledge.3 Yet, it is Augustine,
perhaps, who stands out as one figure who is prominent in utilizing memory as an
important philosophical concept. 4 His broadly Platonic background is probably rightly
suspected as the inspiration for this concept in his thinking. Plato gives memory and
recollection an enduring role in his own philosophizing, a role easily recognizable as
operative already in the dialogue Meno. Here the doctrine that learning is recollection
gives prominence to a cognitive power in learning that seems to many to be totally
overblown. Already Aristotle, in the opening of his treatise on epistemology and method,
the Posterior Analytics, seems taken aback by Plato's teaching and, mentioning the Meno,
tries to wrestle what truth he can out of it, before proceeding with his technical analysis
of scientific reasoning and axiomatized systems.5 Some do not share Aristotle's deference
1Metaphysics 981a2-3: καί δοκεΐ σχεδόν επιστήμη και τέχνη δμοιον είναι καί εμπειρία,
αποβαίνει δ ’ επιστήμη καί τέχνη διά τής· εμπειρία? τοι? άνθρώποι?·
2 PA, II, c. 19, 100a3: έκ μεν συν αίσθήσεω? γίνεται μνήμη, ώσπερ λεγομεν, έκ δε μνήμη?
πολλάκι? του αυτού γινομεμη? εμπειρία· αί γάρ πολλαί μνήμαι τω αριθμώ εμπειρία μία
έστιν. εκ δε εμπειρία?...τέχνη? αρχή καί επιστήμη?.
3 An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Bk. II, c. 27 (Of Identity and Diversity); Bk. II, c.
10 (Of Retention) where he writes, "Memory... is of so great a moment that, where it is wanting,
all of our other faculties are in great measure useless."
4 See Augustine through the Ages: An Encyclopedia, ed. By A. Fitzgerald (Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 1999), "Memory", pp. 553-555. Augustine's reflections on memory include not only
retention of images from the senses but also "ideas acquired through teaching (the definitions of
disciplines; the kinds of questions; distinctions; relationships and the countless laws of numbers
and measures." (p. 554) It is this second bundle of notions that intersects with what, in my
opinion, is important in the understanding of Plato's theory. For Augustine memory also retains
emotive states and experiences, and - in a sense - is the self.
5 Posterior Analytics, I, c. 1,71a27ff.
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and simply reject Plato's doctrine as showing a naïveté in its seeming rejection of the
importance of novelty, empiricism, and contingency in items of knowledge. The
supposition of pre-existing minds that re-incarnate - which seems to be a concomitant
feature of this doctrine - also seems more than many philosophers wish to accept.
The aim of this paper is to present Plato's doctrine within a perspective that will
both explain why Plato found himself prompted to formulate it, as well as explore some
enduring insights exhibited in its applications.6 First, the paper will argue that Plato was
prompted to adopt the doctrine given the difficulties that had arisen from the employment
of the Socratic elenchus. Second, it will argue that hypothesis, already implicit in the
elenchic method, will begin to be developed into a more complex and refined method that
Plato's sees necessary for the whole learning process. The retention of a hypothesis
within a learning situation is what allows that process to succeed. This retention is a
major, albeit not the sole, aspect of what Plato means by anamnesis or recollection. This
section of the paper will consider in some detail parts of the Meno displaying the use of
recollection (e.g., the slave boy conversation) as well as the excursus on the geometrical
use of the method of hypothesis with some reference to that method's use in the later part
of the dialogue. Third, the paper will give some indication of other uses of recollection in
Plato that will make more plausible the doctrine that "learning is recollection."
Part One: The Problem of Elenchus
Many items can become the objects of recollection. One thinks, for instance, of a
rule, an idea, a proposition, an event, an individual, an image, an emotion, or even
another memory. The stereotypical picture that is given of the Platonic doctrine is that
the objects of recollection are transcendent Forms, i.e., immaterial, eternal objects that
correspond to abstract singular or general terms. However, in the early (Socratic)
dialogues there is no development of the doctrine of Forms, nor of recollection, nor of
the method of hypothesis, although there are the makings of these ideas already early on
in Plato's career. 7 A view of Socratic dialectic in action shows that Plato (Socrates) is
concerned to arrive at clear definitions of basic moral ideas that will enable a just
application of those to concrete human situations. However, although the scope of the
method of elenchus (Socratic refutation) has a very lofty rational aim —the clarification
of fundamental moral concepts —its actual application, while revealing the intellectual
deficiencies of the Socratic interlocutors, fails to realize its positive aim. The early
dialogues fail to produce a definition of the topic under their respective scrutiny.
Consider, among others, the Euthyphro on piety, the Laches on courage, the Lysis on
friendship, the Charmides on temperance, perhaps even Republic I on justice. This
failure might well be expected if such critics as Peter Geach are correct in thinking that
the method itself is mistaken and gives rise to what he calls the "Socratic fallacy."8 Plato,
6 Foundational to this topic of recollection is the comprehensive work by C. Huber, Anamnesis
bei Platon (Munich: Max Huber, 1964).
7 R. Allen notes the hints of a doctrine of Forms in the Euthyphro. See his Plato's 'Euthyphro'
and the Earlier Theory o f Forms (New York: Humanities Press, 1970), pp. 67-69.
8 See P.T. Geach, "Plato's Euthyphro" in Logic Matters (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1972), pp. 33-34. Among more recent work on the Socratic Fallacy is the work of D. Wolsdoif,
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too, found himself, in my opinion, confronted with a very serious epistemological and
methodological problem. If the interlocutor does not know already - in some way what is the nature of the quality that is being investigated (e.g., piety, friendship, courage,
etc.) then all discourse is in danger of becoming meaningless. As the application of a
term to a given type becomes subject to scrutiny, the term will lose all significance if its
meaning is not already somehow anchored (albeit the anchor chain, implicit in the
metaphor, may be given an amount of play). Plato came to realize that the Socratic
enterprise could not succeed on the supposition that dialogue can be linguistically
cleansed of problematic conceptions and all interlocutors embark on their investigation
with a blank slate, so to speak.9 He also came to realize that one could not simply trust
socially determined uses of terms to be ontologically accurate. Hence, the theory of
recollection is introduced to solve the first difficulty and the theory of Forms is
introduced, very quickly thereafter, to solve the second. With these two doctrines, a
person enters into the Middle theory of Plato's writings.10
This context might explain the introduction of the theory of recollection, which
otherwise seems hardly able to account for the empirical, historical, and contingent
items that are part of our awareness. Nonetheless, the role of recollection is multi
faceted for Plato and is operative throughout his writing, as will be mentioned later.
However, there is one factor especially which is operative early on and has been
overlooked.
It is one that makes Plato's introduction of recollection much more
comprehensible and even intriguing. This is a methodological factor, namely, the role of
hypothesis in reasoning. Now, it is likely not a mere coincidence that Plato explicitly
begins to talk of the method of hypothesis in the Meno, recommends its use for the
resolution of the problem facing the discussants (i.e., "Can virtue be taught?"), and
provides an example of its use by mathematicians. Somewhat further in the dialogue he
also invokes particular hypotheses to continue the investigation. Later in his middle
writings the (a?) method of hypothesis is explained at length (such as the Phaedo) and
reference is made in the Republic to its use as Plato presents his central images of the
Sun, the Cave, and the Line.11 The argumentation of the Theaetetus is laid out within the
"The Socratic Fallacy and the Epistemological Priority of Definitional Knowledge," Apeiron 37
(2004), pp. 35-67. Wolfsdorf argues that in the Socratic dialogues there is no secure base to
provide the conditions for the right formulation of a definition (p. 67).
9 This metaphor of a blank slate, when applied to the mind of an inquirer or learner, becomes a
problematic one for Plato. It seems more consistent with a transmission theory of learning than it
does with a recollection theory. However, Plato will employ it in his discussion of falsity in the
Theaetetus 191C.
10T. Irwin in "Recollection and Plato's Moral Theory," Review o f Metaphysics 27 (1974), pp.
752-772 has noted the tension between the craft analogy employed in the early dialogues and the
method of recollection yet remarks, nonetheless, that the results of the elenchus itself make way
for Plato's adoption of the theory of recollection. How one divides the periods of Plato's writing
is obviously controversial. In Platonic Ethics, Old and New (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1999) Julia Annas challenges the standard division of Platonic dialogues into early, middle, and
late. Although her focus is the ethical side of Plato's philosophy, she indicates that her work may
have "implications for developmentalism in other areas of Plato's thought" (p. 5).
11 Cf. 100A ff. in the Phaedo and 509-51 IE in the Republic. Note the extensive discussion in K.
Sayre's Plato's Analytic Method (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), pp. 28-56.

Novak/Mmo

4

framework of hypotheses and the Parmenides is also strategically laid out in the same
way. 12
Of course, as the above question mark indicates, one must be cautious when
speaking of the method of hypothesis in Plato. If, as Robinson notes, it is difficult to say
what the method o f dialectic is,1213 it is also difficult to get a clear picture of the
hypothetical method in Plato.14Yet, if one looks carefully at the early Socratic dialogues,
the ground is already laid for the use of what are perhaps more highly diversified and
developed forms of hypothesis employment. The significant philosophical dimension
here, however, is that Plato is tying the learning process - if not all of it, at least a
considerable part of it - to hypothesizing. Hypothesizing by nature implies that the one
using the hypothesis holds it in mind during the reasoning process - as well as, of course,
the steps of the argument that either follow from it or are added to it in the course of
arriving at a conclusion. (One thinks here of the procedures in conditional or reductio ad
absurdum reasoning as well as other forms of reasoning.) Of course, the sense of
"hypothesis" must not be too restrictive; a hypothesis need not always be true, nor must a
person be limited to using only a single one in an argument, as noted by one author.15 It is
by deliberately holding in mind or recalling from memory certain propositions, rules,
and ideas, that one comes to "acquire" new truth or purported truth, i.e., that one comes
to learn.
Part Two: Hypothesis and Recollection
The use of hypothesis as already seminally present in the early dialogues might
become clearer if we look at a few examples. At the start, it should be noted that the very
language of hypothesis is fairly extensive, albeit translators have not always been
sensitive to its presence. Consider the following instances drawn from the recent, and
what is considered - justifiably - the most up-to-date, reliable, and significant translation
in English, the Cooper-Hutchinson edition (multiple translators involved). First consider
two Socratic-type dialogues which, although either spurious or dubious, do incorporate
the style and structure of the early works. In the first, the Rival Lovers, the translator
renders 134C as:
"I'm sure that I would be able to support the claim I made, even if my position were far
weaker than it is."
12 Regarding the layout of the Theaetetus see again the extensive treatment given in Sayre, ibid.
For the Parmenides use of hypothesis, see Sayre, Parmenides' Lesson (Notre Dame: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1996). See also his more compact treatment in "Plato's Parmenides: Why the
Eight Hypotheses are not Contradictory," Phronesis 23 (1978), pp. 133-150.
13 He notes in his Plato's Earlier Dialectic, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953), p. 69: "What
is the nature of this wonderful method? This is a hard question to answer." See more recently, L.
Franklin, "The Structure of Dialectic in the Meno," Phronesis 46 (2001), pp. 413-429.
14There are problems that arise in the Phaedo account vis-à-vis the notion of the agreement
("accord") of the hypothesis with its consequences as noted by both Robinson (ibid., pp. 129ff.)
and Sayre (op. cit., pp. 28-40ff.) as well as an employment in the Meno presumably different
from that in other dialogues (Robinson, ibid., pp. 114ff.).
15See Lynn E. Rose, "Plato's Meno, 86-89," Journal o f the History o f Philosophy (1970), pp. 6-7.
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But it more literally reads:
"I know well that I would be able to strengthen the hypothesis which I hypothesized,
even if I hypothesized a hypothesis weaker than this..."16
We find at Euthyphro 9D:
"You look whether on your part this proposal will enable you to teach me...."
Which more literally is:
" You look whether on your part, if hypothesizing this ...."17
One reads at Euthyphro 11C:
"And they do not want to stay where one puts them. Are these propositions yours?"
but this is more literally translated:
"Are these hypotheses yours?"18
Of course, some translators do hit it just right, as does the one for Hippias Major 299B:
"I think we'll repeat our hypothesis: 'This is what we say is fine, the part of the pleasant
that comes by sight and hearing."'19
But again the nuance seems missed in the Protagoras 339D, which is especially glaring
given its connection with forgetting (i.e., failure to recollect):
"First he asserts himself that it is hard for a man truly to become good, and then, a little
further on in his poem he forgets (epelatheto) and (criticizes Pitttacus):"
which could be better rendered:
"First he hypothesized that it is hard for a man truly to become good, and then, a little
further on in his poem he forgets and (criticizes Pitttacus):"20
Hypothesis does, however, play a role even if the term 'hypothesis' or one of its
cognate forms does not. A striking case is the Laches where Socrates secures from
Laches the assertion that courage is a part of virtue (190C-E): "...an investigation of the
whole of virtue - that would perhaps be too great a task - but let us first see if we have a
sufficient knowledge of a part."21 After many twists and turns of dialectic Socrates
reminds the other interlocutor Nicias at 198A that they were investigating courage at the

16και el· οίδ' δτι Ικανός* αν γενοίμην βοηθήσαι τη ύποθεσει ήν ύπεθεμην, κα'ι el τούτης* ότι
φαυλοτεραν ύπεθεμην
17άλλα συ δή τό σόν σκόπει, el τούτο ύποθεμενος* οϋτω ράστά με διδάξεις* δ ύπεσχου.
18νϋν δε σαι γάρ αί υποθέσεις* εΐσίν.
19έρούμεν δή οίμαι δπερ ύπεθεμεθα.
20δς* γε τό μεν πρώτον αυτός* υπόθετο χαλεπόν είναι άνδρα άγαθόν γενεσθαι άλαθεία,
ολίγον δε τού ποιήματος* εις* τό πρόσθεν προελθών όπελάθετο. Of course this does not mean
that Simonides himself actually thought of hypothesizing. That Plato uses the verb seems to
indicate he is importing his method even into the analysis of the poem.
21 Μή τοίνυν, ώ άριστε, περί δλης* άρετης* εύθεως* σκοπώμεθα πλέον γαρ ’ίσως* εργον άλλα
μέρους* τίνος* περί πρώτον ίδωμεν εί ικανώς* εχομεν προς* τό είδε ναι.
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beginning (κατ' άρχάς-) as a part of virtue22 and at 199E that an agreement had been made
with regard to courage being merely one of the virtues.23 Now using this hypothesis, as
an explicit/indirect one, Socrates is able to reject the proposal of Nicias. The dialogue
ends without resolution.
In shifting focus from the early to the transitional and middle dialogues, the
attention to method becomes explicit. In looking at the Meno, one finds the role played
by methodological aspects of dialectic closely tied to recollection. First, as the question
is raised whether virtue can be taught, Socrates warns Meno that the prior question of the
nature of virtue must be resolved in order to resolve the one about its character as
teachable. In other words, the "what is x?" question must be resolved before the "Is x y?"
question can be resolved. One suspects that in the background is the geometrical practice
of first providing a definition of a figure before any properties could be demonstrated
about it. In anticipation of the upcoming treatment of recollection, Socrates then
cleverly makes puns in response to Meno's query about whether Gorgias' definition of
virtue was correct by saying:
"I do not altogether remember (mnemon), Meno (Menon) ... so you remind (anamneson)
me of what he said." (71C-D).24
After several unsuccessful attempts at definition Socrates reinforces the methodological
point he made at the beginning, i.e., the distinction between, "what is x?" and "is x y?"
questions, by reference to the mathematical definition of shape.25 That mathematics is
playing a prominent role in this dialogue is not surprising, given that the word manthano
means "to learn" (mathema = a thing learned) and the dialogue's supposition is that
learning is recollection. With respect to the earlier discussion on shape, Socrates notes:
"If you remember, when I was answering you about shape, we rejected the kind of
answer that tried to answer in terms still being the subject of inquiry and not yet agreed
upon." (79D)26
The recollection of this regulative principle prompts Meno's protest about Socrates'
numbing tactics and he then articulates the famous paradox.27 The resolution of the
22 Ό τ ι την ανδρείαν κατ' αρχάς- του λόγου έσκοποΟμεν ως- μέρος- αρετής- σκοπουντες-;

23 καί μην εφαμέν γε την ανδρείαν μόριον είναι εν των της- αρετής-.
24 Ου πάνυ είμ! μνημών, ώ Μενών, ώστε ούκ εχω είπείν έν τω παρόντι πώς- μοι τότε εδόξεν.
άλλ' ίσως- εκείνος- τε οίδε, και συ α εκείνος- ελεγε άνάμνησον ουν με πώς- ελεγεν.
25 J.T. Bedu-Addo argues that one should not construe what follows in the dialogue as a
concession to Meno about abandoning the search for the essence of virtue in favor of merely
investigating its quality. See his, "Recollection and the Argument 'From a Hypothesis' in Plato's
Meno" Journal o f Hellenic Studies 104 (1984), pp. 1-14, esp. p. 10 and his "Sense Experience
and Recollection in Plato's Meno," American Journal o f Philology 104 (1983), pp. 228-248, esp.
p. 236.
26 Εί γάρ και μεμνησαι, δτ' εγώ σου άρτι άπεκρινάμην περ'ι του σχήματος-, άπεβάλλομεν
που την τοιαύτην άπόκρισιν την διά των ετι ζητούμενων καί μήπω ώμολογημενων
επιχειρούσαν άποκρίνεσθαι.
27 If you seek to inquire about something you know.... If you seek to inquire about something you
don't know.... The paradox is adumbrated in the dialogue the Euthydemus where it is playfully
put forward by the two sophists 275D ff. Later in that same work Plato also seems to raise the
notion that knowledge of one thing implies knowledge of all things (294A).
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paradox comes about by Plato slipping through the horns of the dilemma (the
dichotomous exclusion of states of knowing and not knowing) by use of the state of
recollecting. Here an initial read of the text leads one to think only of a vision of things
formerly seen - an interpretation not at all unjustified given that Plato has just presented
the Pindar quotation bearing on reincarnation as well as his own assertion that in its
eternal existence the soul has learned all things during its cycles of rebirth. Plato makes
two statements that are then of import (8ID): a) "since all nature is akin and the soul has
learned all things, nothing prevents a person who has recollected one thing (i.e., what
men call learning) from discovering all other things"28 and b) "for searching and learning
are, as a whole, recollection."29 From the second one knows the scope of recollection;
from the first one gets an indication that items of knowledge are not totally atomic and
that in the act of knowing as well, more than a single item of knowledge is involved.30
This first point provides a general principle that will further support the role of hypothesis
in the recollection doctrine.
Plato indeed gives us examples of the use of hypothesis - explicitly at 86E and
87D - but also, I believe, implicitly in the slave boy discourse. As Plato will mention in
the course of the demonstration (82E): "Watch him now recollecting things in order as
one must recollect." The process is not an empirical one - Vlastos has argued well to
show that it is not.31 Nor is the process a haphazard series of "aha" experiences.
Although a good case might be made that there are certain intuitive grasps which serve as
starting points or "evident assumptions" in the course of the proof, there seem to be some
very clear steps at which Plato is employing an articulated hypothesis to achieve the
final solution to the problem32 of doubling the area. For instance, the slave boy's ready
acknowledgement of what a square is, that its sides are equal, that it can vary in size is
due either to these being somehow innate within the lad or immediately obvious.
However, he also assents to a more complex proposition, i.e., "Double the sides of a

28cít6 γάρ τη? φύσαο? άπάση? συγγβνου? ουση?, καί μεμαθηκυία? τη? ψυχή? άπαντα,
ούδέν κώλυα ëv μόνου άναμνασθέντα ο δή μάθησιν καλουσιν άνθρωποι τάλλα πάντα αύτόν
άνβυραν.
29τό γάρ ζή τα ν άρα καί τό μανθάναν άνάμνησι? δλον έστίν. The grammar here of the adverb
is somewhat ambiguous: "for searching and learning are, as a whole, recollection." (Cooper);
"sachant que la recherché, aussi bien, et les leçons qu'on apprend, sont mémoire, en somme." (J.
Cazeaux); "le fait de chercher et le fait d'apprendre sont, au total, une reminiscence." (M. CastoSperber). Is one to read the ho/on as "generally" (i.e., for the most part)? Or as "wholly" (i.e.,
entirely)? Or is it to be taken as recapitulating the reasoning thus far - "summing up"? Perhaps it
is not necessary to resolve whether Plato is hedging here a bit or not. However, see D. Scott,
Recollection and Experience (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 21-22.
30 New knowledge arises from old knowledge in the manner of the explicit arising from the
implicit.
31 See his "Anamnesis in the Meno," Dialogue 4 (1965), pp. 143-67. In order to show the nonempirical dimension of the proof with the slave boy, Vlastos provides an arithmetical analogue to
the geometrical example about doubling the area on pp. 145-147.
32 Whether there is a difference between a problema and a theorema in Greek geometry was
debated in Antiquity. See T.L. Heath, Euclid's Elements (New York: Dover Publications, 1956),
vol. I, pp. 124-129.
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figure and you will double its area" and repeatedly endorses it at 82E and 83A. Yet, as
he employs this, he runs into the undesirable result of a figure four times as large as
expected (83B). By employing but not quite articulating the propositions: "The length
of a side will determine the area of a square;" "The greater the length of the side, the
greater the area;" "The less the length of a side, the smaller the area;" and "A side of
intermediate length will produce an area of intermediate size", the slave boy proposes a
side with a length of three units. Of course, this also fails and the boy is in perplexity.
He is in perplexity because he has the failed options before his mind, i.e., he is
deliberating and holding them from the past reasoning processes - he is recollecting
them. This is an indication that the doctrine "learning is recollection" does not mean,
then, that what someone recollects is something necessarily true. A person, by
employing some mistaken notion in the dialectic process and by retaining that notion and
its implications, can come, eventually, to a grasp of the truth of another, perhaps more
significant, point through the realization that the current approach is erroneous and that
another way is needed.33 Thus, when Socrates remarks at 84A: "You realize, Meno,
what point he has reached in his recollection,"34 the reader should not think that Plato is
merely attempting to persuade his readers by repeating his thesis; Plato has tried to show
what assumptions are held in memory and how they are constitutive of the learning
process.
After Socrates has explained the benefits of the "numbing" process or what some
would refer to as the purificatory side of the elenchic method, he then proceeds to lead
the boy to the grasp of the right answer. One by one he lays out squares (each of area 4
in size) as tiles and receives from the boy the recognition that this constitutes a composite
figure of size 16, one that is four times the required size. At this point Socrates says:
"But we should have had one that was twice as large, or do you not remember!"(84E)35
Here is a definite allusion to the need to recollect prior steps or, above all, the starting
point in a proof. Socrates then proceeds to cut the figure so that diagonals divide the four
squares as to create an inner square. The boy comes to recognize this as the area he
sought. At this point Socrates says to Meno:
"So these opinions (doxai) were in him, were they not? ... So the man who does
not know has within himself true opinions about the things that he does not know?
... These opinions have now just been stirred up like a dream, but if he were
repeatedly asked these same questions in various ways, you know that in the end
his knowledge about these things would be as accurate as anyone's."36

33 Vlastos insists that one must see the mistakes of the slave boy arising not from the empirical
side of mistaken observation: his blunders are "miscalculations, slips of the mind, not of the eye,
faulty inferences, not wrong observations." {ibid., p. 151)
34έννοεΪς· αυ, ώ Μενών, ου έστιν ήδη βαδί^ων δδε του άναμιμνησκεσθαι.
35έδει δέ γε διπλάσιον ήμΐν γενέσθαι ή ου μέμνησαι.
36Ενησαν δέ ye αύτώ αύται α! δόξαι ή οϋ; τω οΰκ είδότι άρα περί ών αν μή είδη ένεισιν
αληθείς“ δόξαι περί τούτων ών ουκ οΐδε; και νυν μεν γε αυτω ώσπερ δναρ άρτι
άνακεκίνηνται al δόξαι αύται εί δέ αυτόν τις“ άνερησεται πολλάκις· τα αυτά ταύτα καί
πολλαχή, οίσθ' δτι τελευτών ουδενός“ήττον ακριβώς“ έπιστησεται περί τούτων.
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Socrates then goes on to relate the presence of these opinions to pre-existence. However,
it is important not to take this as an indication of a desire to reduce the doctrine of
recollection to a simple doctrine of pre-embodiment apprehensive intuitions. The whole
demonstration has shown learning to be a process of constantly interrelating items of
awareness that themselves, in many cases, are resultant from previous reasoning
processes.
Plato has operative in the dialectic presented thus far the elements of
hypothesizing that he will now expressly propose as an important method. As the
dialogue proceeds Socrates now says that to continue the original investigation about the
teachability of virtue, without knowing the essence of virtue, one must engage in using a
hypothetical method similar to that of the geometers:
"agree to investigate whether it is teachable or not by means of a hypothesis. I mean the
way geometers often carry on their investigation. "37
That Plato really is intending a serious comparison is shown by his use of it as a technical
expression as a more accurate translation shows:
"agree to investigate whether it is teachable or not by means of a hypothesis. And I mean
'from hypothesis' in just the way geometers often carry on their investigation ..." (86E)
The exact interpretation of the mathematical example is open to various construals.38
Also open to interpretation is the form or forms of the hypothesis or hypotheses that are
at work in the later part of this dialogue. Yvon Lafrance has proposed three alternatives;
L. Rose has offered at least three.39 So, in the way that only the artistry of Plato can
connect levels of discourse, the dialogue continues now to employ hypothesis in the
learning process of determining whether virtue can be learned; the following lines
evidence multiple instances of the term 'hypothesis'.40 At the end of the dialogue Plato
notes that opinions which one has, need to be tied down in order to become knowledge:
"True opinions are not worth much until one ties them down by (giving) an
account [logismos] of the reason why. And that, Meno my friend, is recollection,
as we previously agreed." (98A).
Plato could have added, "as you must remember" since the reference is to those things
about which "we previously agreed."41 The translator's - in my opinion, fine rendering
of "logismos" notes the active and complex side of this process. Hypothesizing is a
37 "For example, if they are asked whether a specific area can be inscribed in he form of a
triangle within a given circle, one of them might say: Ί do not yet know whether that area has
that property, but I think I have, as it were, a hypothesis that is of use for the problem, namely
this: If the area is such that when one has applied it as a rectangle to the given straight line in the
circle it is deficient by a figure similar to the very figure which is applied, then I think one
alternative results, whereas another results if it is impossible for this to happen. So, by using this
hypothesis, I am willing to tell you what results with regard to inscribing it in the circle, that is,
whether it is impossible or not."' (86E ff.)
38 See R.S. Bluck, Meno (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964), Appendix.
39 La théorie platonicienne de la doxa (Montreal: Bellarmin, 1981), p. 103; L. Rose, ibid., pp. 3-4.
40 Meno 87A2, A7, B4, D3, and 89C3.
41 ώ? èv to Î ç πρόσθ^ν ήμΐν ώμολογηται.
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means of tying things down even if it does not do so definitively. For as Plato will go on
to develop his remarks on hypothesizing in the Phaedo and the Republic, it becomes clear
that the activity of hypothesizing can move on different levels, one replacing another.
Part Three: Additional Aspects of Recollection
Memory and Recollection will continue to play a role in Plato later, even long
after the Meno. In the Phaedo one finds the doctrine of recollection repeated and utilized
in one of the key proofs for the immortality of the soul. Recollection can often occur in
Plato giving accounts of certain doctrines, for instance, the myth of Er (Republic), the
story of Atlantis (Critias), and the story of Creation (Tim aeus). However, the
logical/methodological side also remains while undergoing a metamorphosis as Plato
refines his technique. Another facet of recollection is found in its role as the summation
before the final articulation of a position. Already in the Lysis we find a use that will
move into prominence later. At the end of that dialogue (222D ff.) Socrates notes that the
last option proposed for the definition will not work:
"But we thought we had refuted (exelengxai) ourselves on this point. Or don't you
remember (memnesthe)?" "We remember (memnemetha)."
Socrates then runs through a the list of failed possibilities and then remarks, with some
irony since his list captures the main dialectic moves:
"I certainly don't remember (memnemai) them all anymore.
Later in his writing, Plato introduces the Method of Collection and Division. Mentioned
in the Phaedrus (266A ff), this method will be refined and applied in the later dialogues
where various "trees" of division will furnish the elements for a final statement of
definition. These elements, first articulated in the division process, are then gathered
together as definientia constitutive of the complete definition. Dialogues such as the
Statesman and Sophist illustrate this technique in detail. At the end of the Sophist (268C
ff.) Plato pulls together the elements into a statement that resolves the question raised at
the start: "what is the sophist?":
"Shall we weave his name together from start to finish and tie it up the way we
did before?" "Of course."42
Although Plato's choice of the term 'weaving' depends on the weaving analogy so
important to this dialogue, the collective and reminiscent —one might say 're-collective'
- aspect is unmistakable. In the Statesman (267A) Plato has the Visitor say:
"... let's go back to the beginning and gather together (suneiromen) from there to
the end our account of the name of the expertise of the statesman." 43
42 268C: Ούκουν συνδήσομεν αύτοϋ, καθάπερ έμπροσθεν, τουΐ'ομα συμπλέξάντες' από
τελα/της· έπ’ αρχήν*; TTcu'u μ^ν* ουν. Italics mine.
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At the end of the dialogue (311C) the final enumeration and summation of characteristics
is given in a way similar to that of the Sophist, again using the late analogy of weaving.
However, within the dialogue itself, the Visitor speaks (278A ff.) of the need when trying
to lead on (epagein) those to learn things not yet known (mepo gignoskomena) to go back
(anagein) to cases that have a similarity (homoioteta) so that they get things right. There
are distinct echoes here of the idea of recollection (especially as sketched in the Meno
where there notion of all being akin is raised), even if there is no explicit alluded to it.
In conclusion, this study has attempted to show that the theory ’'learning is
recollection" is more complex than just seeing all learning as resulting in a reminiscence
of a pre-embodiment encounter with a transcendental Form. Even if Plato allows such
Forms to be among the objects of recollection, he does not reduce the significance of the
process by assimilating it to its outcome, the object known. To insist that Forms are not
the object of any recollective process would go against the obvious meaning of some of
the Platonic texts. However, the analysis and examples given above should show that
Plato uses recollection in a much more varied and complex way both with regard to the
objects considered as well as with regard to the activity itself of the mind. With regard
to the former, the things recollected need not be Forms alone, since assumptions,
propositions (true or false) and earlier steps in an argument all can be recollected.4344
With regard to the latter, the activity of recollecting is not simply an instantaneous "aha"
experience, but an extended rehearsal of mental options. If this view can be established
as operative early in Plato's writing, the continuing use of recollection under the different
guises in the later writings can be seen as a natural outgrowth of his earlier method(s). If
the argument above proves cogent, the doctrine of recollection should be seen as far more
complex than a cognitive intuition of objects in another world or of experiences in a
previous existence. Although Plato introduces the doctrine in a context of myth and
reincarnation, his motivation for it and the many varied occurrences of it indicate its
serious philosophical function as well as his belief that it plays the decisive role in the
learning process.
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43 φέρε δή και συνειρωμεν έπανελθόντε? έτη την αρχήν μέχρι τη? τελευτή? τον λόγον τού
όνόματο? τη? του πολίτικου τέχνη?.
44 J.T. Bedu-Addo notes "in the Phaedo we are meant to understand that the λόγοι referred to in
Socrates' description of the hypothetical method are opinions in the form of general explanations
or definitions and that they become υποθέσει? when they are provisionally assumed to be true,"
"Recollection in Plato's Meno," Journal o f Hellenic Studies, 104(1984), p. 3.

